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INTRODUCTION 
“If Sue loves Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry him and Tom 
can’t.  And the difference is based upon their different sex.  Why isn’t 
that a straightforward question of sexual discrimination?” 
 - Chief Justice Roberts at Obergefell v. Hodges oral argument1 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is unlawful 
to discriminate in employment against an individual, “because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”2  The scope of 
the prohibition on “sex” discrimination has consistently been 
expanded over time by statute and case law to recognize new bases and 
forms of discrimination.3  Since 2012, the Equal Employment and 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has maintained that gender identity 
discrimination is an actionable form of sex discrimination for Title VII 
 
 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) 
(No. 14-556). Chief Justice Roberts posed this question to the respondent, the Ohio 
Department of Health, which refused to allow Mr. Obergefell to be listed as the 
surviving spouse on his husband’s death certificate. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2594 (2015). Counsel offered two responses. Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556). First, that banning same-sex marriage 
imposed an equal burden on classes of both men and women. Id. Second, that Tuan 
Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), supported some legal distinctions based on sex 
if they related to biology. Id. This moment and the subsequent argument generated 
significant speculation that Chief Justice Roberts would concur in Obergefell on sex 
discrimination grounds. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Gender Bias Issue Could Tip Chief 
Justice Roberts into Ruling for Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/us/gender-bias-could-tip-chief-justice-roberts-
into-ruling-for-gay-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/TA77-BZWK]. Ultimately, this 
issue failed to appear in either the Obergefell majority opinion or any of the four 
dissents, including the one authored by Chief Justice Roberts. See generally Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Instead, the Chief Justice read his Obergefell dissent 
from the bench, which was the first time he had done so in his ten-year tenure. See 
Amber Phillips, John Roberts’s Full-Throated Gay Marriage Dissent, WASH. POST 
(June 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/06/26/john-
robertss-full-throated-gay-marriage-dissent-constitution-had-nothing-to-do-with-it/ 
[https://perma.cc/PB9Q-U4MC]. 
 2. Unlawful Employment Practices, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964). 
 3. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555 (1978) (adding 
pregnancy discrimination to Title VII’s definition of “sex” discrimination); see also 
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986) (recognizing sexual harassment 
and a hostile working environment as forms of sex discrimination). 
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purposes.4  In 2015, the EEOC concluded that sexual orientation 
discrimination was also a cognizable form of sex discrimination.5  Two 
circuit courts, the Seventh and the Second Circuit, have since also 
adopted this interpretation.6  On April 22, 2019, the Supreme Court 
agreed to consider these most recent expansions by granting certiorari 
in three cases: Altitude Express v. Zarda and Bostock v. Clayton 
County, Georgia, which address sexual orientation discrimination, and 
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, which addresses 
gender identity discrimination.7  The Court heard oral arguments in all 
three cases on October 8, 2019.8 
Hively v. Ivy Tech and Zarda v. Altitude Express are two circuit 
decisions that embrace an interpretation of Title VII that includes 
sexual orientation protections.9  Both cases involved gay employees 
who were fired because of their sexual orientation.10  The plaintiffs 
relied on some combination of three different theories in order to 
advance the claim that sexual orientation discrimination necessarily 
constitutes sex discrimination.  The first is a comparative “but-for” test, 
which asks whether the injured plaintiff would have been treated 
differently if their sex were changed.11  The second theory is 
“associational” discrimination, an analogy to Loving v. Virginia and 
racial discrimination, which suggests that discrimination based on the 
sex of one’s partner constitutes discrimination based on one’s own 
sex.12  The third theory is that discrimination against sexual minorities 
is a form of sex stereotyping, which is already actionable under Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, either because sexual minorities often violate 
 
 4. Macy v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC DOC 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (Apr. 20, 
2012). 
 5. Baldwin v. Dep’t of Transp., EEOC DOC 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (July 
15, 2015). 
 6. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018); Hively v. Ivy 
Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 7. See Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Bostock v. Clayton 
Cty., 139 S. Ct. 2049 (2019); R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. 
Ct. 1599 (2019); Amy Howe, Court to Take Up LGBT Rights in the Workplace 
(Updated), SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 22, 2019), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/04/court-to-take-up-lgbt-rights-in-the-workplace/ 
[https://perma.cc/JL26-T3NU]. 
 8. Adam Liptak & Jeremy Peters, Supreme Court Considers Whether Civil Rights 
Act Protects L.G.B.T. Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/us/politics/supreme-court-gay-transgender.html 
[https://perma.cc/4FAR-5NYS]. 
 9. See generally Zarda, 883 F.3d 100; Hively, 853 F.3d 339. 
 10. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 110; Hively, 853 F.3d at 345. 
 11. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345. 
 12. Id. at 334. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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strict gender stereotypes or, more broadly, because being non-
heterosexual is inherently a violation of sex stereotypes.13 
While each of these theories was sufficient to link discrimination 
against their gay or lesbian plaintiffs in those specific factual contexts, 
they are not conceptually broad enough to consistently capture 
discrimination that targets bisexuals, asexuals, and other non-
monosexual orientations.  These orientations do not necessarily pass 
desire through the lens of sex and therefore make poor comparators, 
can lack associations, or conform with stereotypes.  This under-
inclusivity is not trivial, as bisexuals alone constitute a majority of the 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community.14  
These theories are also conceptually distinct from those addressing 
whether transgender people are also covered by Title VII, despite the 
fact that the vast majority (up to 85%) of transgender people do not 
identify as heterosexual.15  If these limitations are not addressed, a 
favorable rule may not effectively capture all sexual orientation 
discrimination, and that under-inclusivity may help LGBT opponents 
argue that sex and sexual orientation discrimination are not necessarily 
linked phenomena for the purposes of Title VII. 
Part I of this Note discusses the history of Title VII’s prohibition on 
sex discrimination, tracing the additions of pregnancy discrimination, 
sexual harassment, and sex stereotyping as cognizable forms of sex 
discrimination over time.  Part II then evaluates the three theories 
advanced by Hively and Zarda — comparators, association, and 
stereotyping — focusing on their shortcomings in the face of particular 
sexual orientations.  Finally, Part III advances additional rationales to 
conceptually link sex and sexual orientation discrimination without 
reinforcing “monosexism.”16  This Note argues that effective capture 
 
 13. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346. 
 14. Approximately 1.7% of all Americans identify as lesbian or gay, whereas 1.8% 
of the population identifies as bisexual. GARY GATES, WILLIAMS INST., HOW MANY 
PEOPLE ARE LGBT? 1 (2011), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Gates-How-Many-People-LGBT-Apr-2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5CZQ-2CU3]. 
 15. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. 
TRANSGENDER SURVEY 59 (2016), 
https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M5TS-YKXJ]. 
 16. “Monosexism” refers to: 
[A]n essentialist perception of sexual orientations as solely occurring 
between members of same or different genders . . . . Any sexuality that blends 
same and different gender interactions is deemed illegitimate, occurring in a 
state of sexuality confusion, an experimental phase, or that bisexual persons 
are somehow dishonest about their orientation, attractions, and their identity. 
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of all sexual orientations by Title VII’s protections requires a rejection 
of tests that look for a disparate impact between men and women, 
which would also eliminate the so-called “bisexual harasser” defense 
to sexual harassment claims.17 
The cases before the Supreme Court are not isolated incidents.  Of 
the nearly 11 million LGBT people in the United States, 88% are 
employed.18  Twenty-five percent report experiencing discrimination 
in the workplace in the past year.19  Gay men and lesbian women on 
average receive less income than their heterosexual counterparts, and 
22% of LGBT persons report not being paid or promoted at the same 
rate as their colleagues.20  LGBT people live in all parts of the country, 
even constituting up to 5% of the United States’ rural population, 
where LGBT persons may need to travel further for services where 
they still face discrimination.21 However, the impacts of these cases are 
more acutely felt in cities22 because 80% of LGBT Americans live in 
suburban or urban areas.23 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF TITLE VII’S PROHIBITION ON 
DISCRIMINATION “BECAUSE OF” SEX 
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination, like its prohibitions on 
racial or religious discrimination, does not enumerate specific 
 
Tangela S. Roberts et al., Between a Gay and a Straight Place: Bisexual Individuals’ 
Experiences with Monosexism, 15 J. BISEXUALITY 554, 555 (2015). 
 17. See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding “[b]oth 
before and after Oncale . . . Title VII does not cover the ‘equal opportunity’ or 
‘bisexual’ harasser, then, because such a person is not discriminating on the basis of 
sex. He is not treating one sex better (or worse) than the other; he is treating both sexes 
the same” (emphasis in original)). 
 18. THE NAT’L LGBT WORKERS CTR., LGBT PEOPLE IN THE WORKPLACE 1–2 
(2019) http://www.lgbtmap.org/file/LGBT-Workers-3-Pager-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XQX6-PUKN]. 
 19. Id. at 2. 
 20. Id. 
 21. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, WHERE WE CALL HOME: LGBT PEOPLE 
IN RURAL AMERICA 2–6 (2019), http://www.lgbtmap.org/file/lgbt-rural-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y4YC-678W]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Leila Fadel, New Study: LGBT People A ‘Fundamental Part of The Fabric 
Of Rural Communities’, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/04/709601295/lgbt-people-are-a-fundamental-part-of-
the-fabric-of-rural-communities [https://perma.cc/JZ9E-WC8Y]; see also Caitlin 
Rooney & Laura E. Durso, The Harms of Refusing Service to LGBTQ People and 
Other Marginalized Communities, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/reports/2017/11/29/443392/harms-
refusing-service-lgbtq-people-marginalized-communities/ [https://perma.cc/99MB-
YR5B]. 
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discriminatory practices.24  In fact, “sex” as a protected category was 
added to the Civil Rights Act with a last-minute amendment 
introduced by Howard Smith of Virginia, an opponent of the overall 
bill.25  While commentators have derisively suggested that “sex” was 
added to the Civil Rights Act merely as a joke, or as a way for 
representative Smith to derail the efforts to combat race 
discrimination, that interpretation ignores the genuine coalition of 
conservative National Woman’s Party-aligned politicians and liberal 
Equal Rights Amendment advocates that secured its passage in both 
chambers of Congress.26  Ultimately, the Supreme Court has 
consistently decided that the legislative history of Title VII’s 
prohibition on “sex” discrimination is of limited interpretive value.27  
Instead, the Court actively chose not to give weight to the legislative 
history and instead interpreted the statute on their own, exploring the 
parameters of what constitutes sex discrimination.  Part I summarizes 
this exploration, focusing on where the court has openly expanded 
“sex” beyond the enacting Congress’s intent, citing fidelity to the law’s 
broad text, as seen in the sexual harassment context.  At the same time, 
Part I will evaluate explicit congressional overrides of opinions where 
the Court chose to construe Title VII narrowly, such as in the 
pregnancy discrimination context.28 
A. Pregnancy Discrimination: A “Strongly Sex-Related” Trait 
In the early years following Title VII’s enactment, the protracted 
legislative history around Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination 
was invoked to constrain the reach of sex discrimination doctrines.29  
 
 24. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 25. Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & 
L. 137, 150–51 (1997). 
 26. Id. at 149–52. 
 27.  See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) (“[T]he legislative 
history of Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination is notable primarily for its 
brevity.”); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (noting “the 
bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left with little legislative history to guide us 
in interpreting the Act’s prohibition against discrimination based on ‘sex’”). 
 28. Compare Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998) 
(expanding Title VII’s prohibition on sexual harassment to include acts of same-sex 
harassment) with Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 143 (finding that pregnancy discrimination was 
not covered by Title VII’s sex discrimination provision). 
 29. See, e.g., Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) 
(finding that sexual harassment was not a form of sex discrimination actionable under 
Title VII, and citing its “little” legislative history). “[It] would be a potential federal 
lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward 
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While six circuit courts unanimously interpreted Title VII to include 
pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination, the Supreme 
Court rejected this theory when it first heard a pregnancy 
discrimination case.30  In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Supreme 
Court upheld a disability plan provided to employees that had a single 
exclusion from its coverage: pregnancy-based disabilities.31  Many of 
the arguments made by Justice Rehnquist in his majority opinion echo 
the dissents in Hively v. Ivy Tech and Zarda v. Altitude Express. 
For instance, according to the majority opinion written by 
Rehnquist, the offending disability benefits program in Gilbert 
“divide[d] potential recipients into two groups — pregnant women and 
nonpregnant persons.  While the first group is exclusively female, the 
second includes members of both sexes.”32  Therefore, there was no 
risk insured by the program from which men were protected and 
women were not, and there was not a sufficient nexus between 
pregnancy and gender such that discrimination based on the pregnancy 
was per se gender discrimination.33  In the context of sexual 
orientation, the dissenting opinions in Hively and Zarda similarly 
argue that discriminating based on sexual orientation does not create a 
“risk” that disadvantages or privileges only one sex — but merely 
creates subcategories of sexes.34 
Justices Brennan and Marshall authored a dissent in Gilbert 
rejecting such a narrow view of “discrimination” in the Title VII 
context.35  First, their dissent notes that the “broad social objectives 
promoted by Title VII” were “incompatible” with such a narrow view 
of what constitutes discrimination.36  Second, even though pregnancy 
discrimination was not discrimination against all women, it would 
 
another. The only sure way an employer could avoid such charges would be to have 
employees who were asexual.” Id. at 163–64. 
 30. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145–46. 
 31. See generally id. 
 32. Id. at 135. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., 
dissenting) (“Title VII . . . is aimed at employment practices that differentially 
disadvantage men vis-à-vis women or women vis-à-vis men. Discrimination against 
persons whose sexual orientation is homosexual rather than heterosexual . . . is not 
discrimination that treats men and women differently.”); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. 
Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 370 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (arguing “sexual-
orientation discrimination does not classify people according to invidious or 
idiosyncratic male or female stereotypes. It does not spring from a sex-specific bias at 
all”). 
 35. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. 
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“offend[] common sense to suggest . . . that a classification [based on 
pregnancy] is not, at the minimum, strongly ‘sex related.’”37  In other 
words, rather than focus on the creation of a disparate impact between 
men and women, Brennan’s view of Title VII saw discrimination 
wherever strongly sex-linked classifications were deployed to 
selectively disadvantage subcategories of a protected class. 
Congress acted swiftly to overturn the majority’s interpretation in 
Gilbert with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), passed a mere 
two years after the decision.38  The legislative history of the PDA 
makes Congress’s distaste for the Supreme Court’s narrowing of Title 
VII’s protections clear.  Harrison Williams, Chairman of the 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, wrote in a foreword to 
the bill’s final committee reports that “the [Gilbert] Court contravened 
the intent of Congress in enacting Title VII . . . that all individuals be 
fully protected against unjust discrimination.”39  Senators who had 
previously voted for the Civil Rights Act itself made clear that they did 
not see the PDA as expanding Title VII, but clarifying for the skeptical 
Court that a broad elimination of sex discrimination had been their 
intention when they initially voted for the bill.40 
The story of the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize pregnancy 
discrimination as within Title VII’s mandate, followed by swift 
congressional rebuke, should be a cautionary tale as the Court 
approaches the question of sexual orientation discrimination.41  Today, 
even without the PDA’s specific enumeration of “pregnancy” into Title 
VII’s text, it would be difficult for one to imagine that pregnancy 
discrimination would not fall within sex discrimination.42  However, the 
Gilbert majority’s arguments regarding why pregnancy discrimination 
did not constitute sex discrimination — that pregnancy lacked a 
sufficient sex-specific nexus since many women are not or are never 
pregnant43 — would be even stronger today in light of increased 
visibility of transgender people.  The question remains: Does the now 
real, albeit currently rare, phenomenon of legally-recognized 
 
 37. Id. at 149 (internal citations omitted). 
 38. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555 (1978). 
 39. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, S. 
REP. NO. 54-748, at III (1978). 
 40. Id. at 8. 
 41. See generally Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018); 
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 42. Liz Elting, Why Pregnancy Discrimination Still Matters, FORBES (Oct. 30, 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lizelting/2018/10/30/why-pregnancy-
discrimination-still-matters/#6f1f4bf763c1 [https://perma.cc/N5WX-UET6]. 
 43. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134–35 (1976). 
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transgender men becoming pregnant further undermine the sex-
specific nexus of pregnancy discrimination?44  To sustain the concept 
that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination when men are also 
able to become pregnant, discrimination must mean something other 
than just exposing “one sex . . . to disadvantageous terms or conditions 
of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”45  
Instead, discrimination should be based on a trait that is “strongly ‘sex 
related.’”46 
B. Sexual Harassment: Creation of the “Bisexual Harasser” Problem 
Eight years after Title VII was amended to include pregnancy 
discrimination, the Supreme Court addressed whether claims of sexual 
harassment and a hostile work environment were claims of sex 
discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.47  Unlike the case of 
pregnancy discrimination, where all the circuit precedent unanimously 
supported the broader interpretation of Title VII, a number of courts 
had already expressed skepticism that sexual harassment in the 
workplace should be considered “discrimination.”48  That said, the 
Supreme Court apparently had gotten the message from Congress that 
“the phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces 
a[n] . . . intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment 
of men and women.’”49  While the expanded focus on the entire 
spectrum of treatment allowed the Court to recognize sexual 
harassment as a form of sex discrimination, its continued emphasis on 
the disparate treatment of men and women perpetuated a statutory 
absurdity: the so-called “bisexual harasser defense.”50  Essentially, 
 
 44. See David Fontana & Naomi Schoenbaum, Unsexing Pregnancy, 119 COLUM. 
L. REV. 309, 338 (2019). 
 45. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 46. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 652 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 47. 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). In Meritor, a female employee brought an action after 
she was fired following years of sexual abuse and rape at the hands of her supervisor. 
The employer fired the female employee for an alleged abuse of sick leave. The Court 
decided unanimously that pervasive sexual harassment could create a “hostile or 
abusive work environment” and constituted cognizable injury under Title VII despite 
the lack of tangible economic discrimination. Id. 
 48. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (arguing 
“flirtations of the smallest order would give rise to liability”), rev’d on other grounds, 
600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 49. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (internal citations omitted). 
 50. See Robin Applebaum, Note, The “Undifferentiating Libido”: A Need for 
Federal Legislation to Prohibit Sexual Harassment by a Bisexual Sexual Harasser, 14 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 613–15 (1997). 
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when a man sexually harasses women in the workplace, which would 
generally be considered sex discrimination, the man can then allege he 
equally harasses men, and therefore does not discriminate based on 
sex.51  In effect, the bisexual harasser is immune from Title VII claims, 
rather than subject to claims by both male and female victims.52 
Before Meritor reached the Supreme Court, Judge Bork of the D.C. 
Circuit authored a dissent, joined by then-Judge Scalia, to rehear the 
case en banc.53  In a footnote, Judge Bork highlighted the doctrinal 
difficulty that would emerge if sexual harassment were actionable 
under Title VII but only if it occurred in a way that discriminated 
between the sexes: 
[T]his court holds that only the differentiating libido runs afoul of 
Title VII, and bisexual harassment, however blatant and however 
offensive and disturbing, is legally permissible . . . . That bizarre result 
suggests that Congress was not thinking of individual harassment . . . . 
If it is proper to classify harassment as discrimination for Title VII 
purposes, that decision at least demands adjustments in subsidiary 
doctrines.54 
Although the Meritor court rejected Bork’s argument that Title VII 
was not meant to include sexual harassment, it did not address the 
specter of the bisexual harasser defense.55  Rather than update 
subsidiary doctrines to establish that liability attaches when there is 
pervasive sexual harassment despite “equal opportunity,” the Supreme 
Court implicitly allowed the requirement of disparate impact to 
persist.56  While some courts have devised individual workarounds to 
this theoretical problem by focusing on the so-called bisexual 
harasser’s target at a particular time, others continue to recognize the 
defense in some shape or form.57  In jurisdictions that recognize the 
 
 51. Id. at 615. 
 52. Id. at 616. 
 53. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 1333 n.7. 
 55. See generally Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 56. “The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces a 
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women in the workplace.” Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added). 
“Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of 
one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial 
harassment is to racial equality.” Id. at 67 (emphasis added); see also Harris v. Forklift 
Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 57. Compare Tietgen v. Brown’s Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1501 
n.10 (E.D. Va. 1996) (suggesting that the bisexual sexual harasser defense may be 
overcome by focusing on what sex the bisexual person was targeting at the time), with 
Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Title VII does not 
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defense, one can escape Title VII liability for sexually harassing an 
employee by doubling that harm and also harassing someone of a 
different sex.58 
Twelve years later, during oral arguments in Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, the Supreme Court seemed just as confused as the 
D.C. Circuit as to the existence of Title VII liability for the bisexual 
harasser, consistent with the lower court’s findings.59  There, Mr. 
Oncale sued his employer, Sundowner Offshore Services, alleging 
sexual harassment by his male supervisor and two male co-workers.60  
Mr. Oncale filed a Title VII claim against his employer because the 
harassment was pervasive and included verbal and physical threats of 
rape.61  Although the question before the Court was whether acts of 
same-sex harassment were actionable under Title VII, a significant 
portion of the oral arguments were dedicated to the bisexual harasser 
problem.62  The Courts extensively discussed a hypothetical posed by 
Justice O’Connor about a supervisor “with the unfortunate habit of 
patting each employee, male or female, on the fanny every day.”63  The 
Justices struggled with whether sex was “relational,” or whether the 
discrimination requirement meant that such equal treatment would 
render that conduct legal.64 
The unanimous opinion authored by Justice Scalia is notable for 
what it addresses, but also for what it omits.  First, he writes that while 
same-sex harassment was “assuredly not the principal evil Congress 
was concerned with when it enacted Title VII[,] . . . statutory 
prohibitions often . . . cover reasonably comparable evils.”65  Same-sex 
harassment, the Court concluded, met the statutory requirements and 
therefore, fell within Title VII’s scope.66  Despite the extended 
discussion of the bisexual harasser problem at oral argument, the issue 
was not included in the opinion, nor was there any discussion of 
 
provide relief against a bisexual harasser that treats “both sexes the same (albeit 
badly)”), and Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding 
no Title VII violation where employee harassed both male and female colleagues). 
 58. Holman, 211 F.3d at 403. 
 59. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568). 
 60. Sonya Smallets, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services: A Victory for Gay 
and Lesbian Rights?, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 136, 137 (1999). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 59. 
 63. Id. at 20. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 66. Id. at 80. 
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whether gross sexual conduct, in and of itself, could constitute 
discrimination “because of sex.”67  The Court’s silence is particularly 
notable given Scalia’s previous support for Bork’s dissent in Vinson, 
which called for either a disavowal of sexual harassment doctrine 
altogether or the elimination of the requirement to find discrimination 
between the sexes.68  Despite the severe harassment experienced by 
Mr. Oncale, there were no women on his team against whom his 
treatment could be compared, and it was unclear whether Oncale’s 
extension of Title VII protections was broad enough to cover Mr. 
Oncale’s case.69  The parties in Oncale settled soon after the decision.70 
C. Sex Stereotyping: Remedy for “Acting” But Not “Being” Gay 
One relevant theory of sex discrimination advanced by the Hively 
and Zarda opinions is that of sex stereotyping, first recognized in the 
plurality opinion of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.71  In Price 
Waterhouse, the Supreme Court recognized that an employer engages 
in sex discrimination by relying on gender stereotypes to make an 
employment decision.72  In summarizing why such behavior would be 
included under Title VII, the Court characterized Title VII as a “simple 
but momentous announcement” that sex is “not relevant to the 
selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees.”73 
Despite this broad pronouncement, it remains unclear whether 
disparate impact between sexes caused by stereotyping is necessary to 
sustain a claim of sex discrimination.74  The critical question for Title 
VII purposes is “whether members of one sex are exposed to 
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members 
of the other sex are not exposed.”75  This test, articulated in Justice 
Ginsburg’s concurrence in Harris v. Forklift Systems and reaffirmed by 
the unanimous Court in Oncale, focuses on sex in a way that reinforces 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J. dissenting). 
 69. Smallets, supra note 60, at 140. 
 70. Id. at 140 n.33. 
 71. 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 239. 
 74. Compare Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 
2006) (upholding different “grooming standards” for male and female bartenders), 
with EEOC v. R.G., 884 F.3d 560, 574 (6th Cir. 2018) (explicitly rejecting the need for 
a disparate impact between men and women to sustain a sex stereotyping Title VII 
claim). 
 75. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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the gender binary.76  On its face, it ignores the nearly 1.7% of the 
population that identifies as intersex.77  Most troublingly, the test 
reinforces the need to compare how a standard impacts men relative to 
women to find discrimination, no matter how gross or targeted the 
offending conduct is.78  In other words, if the stereotypes enforced 
impact more than one sex, there is no sex discrimination.  This 
requirement is no different than in the bisexual harasser problem, 
where double discrimination is insulated, and would undermine 
contemporary arguments about pregnancy discrimination in light of 
the reality of male pregnancy.79  Instead of focusing on the motivating 
factor of the discrimination, its magnitude in a vacuum, or its impacts 
on perpetuating a particular gender expression, a Harris-style 
requirement focuses the inquiry on the discrimination’s impact on the 
relative position of only males versus females and only with respect to 
one another.80 
D. Attempts to Add Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity to Title 
VII 
Some supporters of Title VII’s expansion toward covering sexual 
orientation discrimination generally admit that it is “well-nigh certain” 
that sexual orientation was not considered by legislators who enacted 
Title VII.81  When the law was enacted in 1964, it was still illegal to be 
gay in all but one state.82  The year after Congress passed the Civil 
Rights Act, an expanded Democratic majority enacted the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act, which made it illegal for “sexual 
deviants,” like homosexuals, to enter the country.83  In short, the 
 
 76. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25). 
 77. See generally ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY (2000). 
 78. Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsberg, J., concurring). 
 79. See infra Sections I.A–B. 
 80. Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsberg, J., concurring). 
 81. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 353 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, 
J., concurring); see also Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 134 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(Jacobs, J., concurring). 
 82. Illinois was the first state to decriminalize homosexual sodomy in 1961, 
following the 1955 recommendations from the American Law Institute for the Model 
Penal Code. It would be another ten years until Connecticut became the second state 
to do the same in 1971. See Getting Rid of Sodomy Laws: History and Strategy That 
Led to the Lawrence Decision, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/getting-rid-sodomy-laws-history-and-strategy-led-
lawrence-decision [https://perma.cc/873A-5R7T] (last visited Apr. 21, 2019). 
 83. Immigration and Naturalization Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236 (1965) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952)); see Sharita Gruberg, On the 50th Anniversary of 
444 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
government viewed discrimination against LGBT persons as an 
important regulation applying to a category of people labeled as 
“criminals” and “disordered” by state and federal laws.84 
Although Oncale protected LGBT Americans from sex 
discrimination when targeted by a colleague of the same sex and Price 
Waterhouse supplemented protections against being punished due to 
sex stereotypes, the circuit courts are still resistant to allowing LGBT 
persons to “bootstrap” sexual orientation discrimination claims to sex 
discrimination claims.85  As a result, Congress has attempted to amend 
Title VII more than 50 times to explicitly include sexual orientation 
and gender identity as protected categories.86  The most recent attempt 
is the Equality Act, which would add sexual orientation and gender 
identity not only to Title VII but also to a variety of other civil rights 
laws.87  Unlike previous iterations of the law, such as the 2012–2013 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), the Equality Act does 
not contain a religious exemption and instead provides that the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act may not serve as a defense to 
sexual orientation or gender identity-based Title VII claims.88  While 
the measure has broad support in the House of Representatives, its 
prospects for passage in the Senate remain unclear.89 
 
the INA, Changes Are Needed to Protect LGBT Immigrants, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Mar. 23, 2015), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2015/03/23/109534/on-the-50th-
anniversary-of-the-immigration-and-nationality-act-changes-are-needed-to-protect-
lgbt-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/ZY77-5AUK]. 
 84. See Gruberg, supra note 83. 
 85. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 86. See, e.g., Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015); Employment Non-
Discrimination Act, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 811, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 1584, 
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3285, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 
1284, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. 
(1997); S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 87. The Equality Act, H.R. 5, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Michelangelo Signorile, 
LGBT Rights Are Under Attack. America Needs the Equality Act — Urgently, DAILY 
BEAST (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.thedailybeast.com/lgbt-rights-are-under-attack-
america-needs-the-equality-acturgently [https://perma.cc/TJ8W-JQNL]. 
 88. Compare 113 CONG. REC. S7901 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2013) (featuring the first 
openly lesbian Senator, Tammy Baldwin, stating that “religious organizations are not 
touched” by ENDA) with H.R. 5, 116th Cong. (2019) (“The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 . . . shall not provide a claim concerning, or a defense to a 
claim under, a covered title, or provide a basis for challenging the application or 
enforcement of a covered title.”). 
 89. See Nick Martin, Joe Manchin Will Vote Against the Equality Act, Because of 
Course He Will, SPLINTER (Mar. 19, 2019), https://splinternews.com/joe-manchin-will-
vote-against-the-equality-act-because-1833403586 [https://perma.cc/64FT-JH9E]. 
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Given the longstanding congressional inaction on the issue of LGBT 
workplace discrimination, the circuits diverge on whether and what 
kinds of discrimination are actionable under Title VII.  While there are 
strong textual arguments which contend that LGBT persons are 
protected by the current law, many of these arguments rest on 
problematic theories that perpetuate gender binarism. 
II. HIVELY, ZARDA, AND MONOSEXISM IN PURSUIT OF LIBERATION 
The open question of whether a disparate impact between men and 
women is necessary to sustain a Title VII claim not only creates 
absurdities in existing sex discrimination jurisprudence, but it also 
threatens to erroneously establish perceptions that sexual orientation 
discrimination and sex discrimination as discrete phenomena.  Hively, 
Zarda, and Baldwin advance three different theories to support the 
position that sexual orientation discrimination is necessarily sex 
discrimination.90  These three theories include a comparative test, 
associational discrimination, and sex stereotyping.91  While each theory 
captures some instances of sexual orientation discrimination within the 
existing sex discrimination frameworks, particularly acts against gays 
or lesbians, they fail to adequately address discrimination against 
bisexuals, asexuals, and other non-monosexual identities.92  This lack 
of consideration for cases involving bisexuals is consistent with 
repeated bisexual erasure within the LGBT community, and in the law 
more generally.93  This Part will explore the limitations of each of the 
three theories, with a focus on their inability to capture orientations 
which fall outside of binarist assumptions. 
A. The Comparative Test 
Hively v. Ivy Tech articulates the first theory, the comparative test, 
which asks, but-for the employee’s sex, would the same discriminatory 
act still have occurred?94  The circuits took issue with the application 
of the comparative test as an interpretative tool used to determine the 
 
 90. See generally Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 100 (2d Cir. 2018); 
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 339 (7th Cir. 2017); Baldwin v. 
Foxx, EEOC DOC 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (July 15, 2015). 
 91. See generally Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100; Hively, 853 F.3d at 339; Baldwin, 2015 WL 
4397641, at *5. 
 92. Elizabeth Childress Burneson, The Invisible Minority: Discrimination Against 
Bisexuals in the Workplace, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 63, 64 (2018). 
 93. See generally Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 353, 367 (2000). 
 94. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345. 
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scope of Title VII, rather than a factual one used to determine actual 
motive in a particular case.95  Further, the test assumes that men must 
be compared to women to qualify as discrimination “based on” sex.  In 
Hively, the Seventh Circuit applied the test by comparing the plaintiff, 
a woman in a same-sex marriage who alleged she was denied a 
promotion because of her marriage, to a hypothetical male employee 
who was also married to a woman.96  The Court reasoned that but-for 
Hively’s sex, she would have been promoted, as the man married to a 
woman would not be subject to the same adverse treatment.97  
Although this analogy was effective in the case of Hively, a lesbian 
woman, it is defective in other scenarios where the plaintiff is not 
monosexual. 
The specific application of the comparative method by the Second 
Circuit in Zarda and Seventh Circuit in Hively also did not isolate a 
single motivating variable for the employees’ terminations: sex or 
sexual orientation.  When the circuits applied the comparative test, 
they switched both the sex and the sexual orientation of the plaintiffs, 
comparing a gay woman to a straight man in Hively, and a gay man to 
a straight woman in Zarda.98  However, to isolate a motivating variable 
for a discriminatory action, the courts could have compared the gay 
female employee to a gay male employee, and vice versa.  Had a court 
compared a gay woman to a gay man — holding sexual orientation 
constant but changing sex — an anti-gay employer could make the 
same adverse decision, thus isolating sexual orientation, not sex, as the 
motivating cause for termination.  This argument was explicitly 
advanced by respondents during oral arguments in Bostock.99 
The utility of the comparative test becomes even more suspect when 
applied to various bisexual victims of sexual orientation discrimination. 
Suppose an employer with anti-LGBT beliefs fires a bisexual woman 
upon discovery of her sexual orientation, which was not obvious 
because she was engaged to a cisgender man.  To determine if this was 
sex discrimination under the comparative method, we would change 
the sex of the plaintiff, and determine how the employer would treat 
the plaintiff if she was a bisexual man engaged to a man.  Unlike in 
 
 95. See id. at 367 (Sykes, J., dissenting); Zarda, 883 F.3d at 134 (Jacobs, J., 
concurring). 
 96. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345–46. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id.; Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119. 
 99. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–8, Bostock v. Clayton County, 139 S. Ct. 1599 
(2019) (No. 17-1623) [hereinafter Bostock Transcript of Oral Argument]. 
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Hively, where changing the sex of the lesbian plaintiff created a 
heterosexual comparator who would not be subject to discrimination, 
here, changing the plaintiff’s sex only makes the plaintiff’s queerness 
(and the incentive to discriminate) more obvious to the employer.  A 
comparative test that only compares the treatment of women to the 
treatment of similarly situated men therefore fails to isolate sex as a 
cause in the case of discrimination against a bisexual person, and 
cannot be used to extend Title VII’s protections against sex 
discrimination to such cases. 
The current formulation of the comparative test also fails to capture 
discrimination against bisexuals versus their gay and lesbian 
counterparts within its “sex discrimination” umbrella.  In the real 
world, there is evidence that bisexuals are subjected to more 
discrimination in the workplace than even their gay and lesbian 
counterparts.100  This may be because bisexual employees can be 
victimized by both biphobia and homophobia.101  It may also explain 
why only 11% of bisexual employees are “out” to their co-workers, 
whereas half of gay men and lesbian are.102  Suppose a gay employer 
were to continually harass a female bisexual employee, who is currently 
single, but discussing her orientation by restating antiquated tropes 
that all bisexuals are merely hiding their “real” homosexual 
orientation.  The comparative test provides no path to recourse, as 
changing the sex of the plaintiff does not make the employer’s remarks 
any less likely to occur. 
Perhaps the fatal conceit of the current formulation of the 
comparative method is that it assumes, a priori, that sex and sexual 
orientation can be distinct variables, not functions of one another.  Can 
one have a sexual orientation without first identifying one’s sex?  The 
current comparator test, although deployed in Hively to link sex and 
sexual orientation, suggests you can separate the two in other cases.  If, 
instead, sexuality is understood to be a function of sex, it becomes 
possible to use not only various sexes (beyond just “men” and 
“women”) as comparators, but also different sexual orientations 
themselves.  If a bisexual victim of employment discrimination can be 
compared to a hypothetical heterosexual or homosexual employee, 
 
 100. Anne E. Tweedy & Karen Yescavage, Employment Discrimination Against 
Bisexuals: An Empirical Study, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 699, 735 (2015). 
 101. Id. 
 102. New Report: Bisexual People Face Invisibility, Isolation, and Shocking Rates 
of Discrimination and Violence, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Sept. 27, 
2016), http://www.lgbtmap.org/invisible-majority-release [https://perma.cc/VV8Z-
EFWD]. 
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instead of just a man or woman of the “opposite” sex, we can then also 
identify any unique ways in which a bisexual person can be 
discriminated against. 
B. Associational Discrimination 
A minority of the circuits follow the second theory finding that 
sexual orientation discrimination is necessarily associational 
discrimination based on the sex of one’s partner.103  In Hively, the 
plaintiff alleged that she was denied a promotion because of the sex of 
her partner, and therefore, she was discriminated against on the basis 
of her own sex.104  This theory originated in Loving v. Virginia, which 
in the case of anti-miscegenation laws, recognized that the “equal 
application” of racial classifications was a tool of white supremacy.105  
In short, an employer who discriminates against a person in an 
interracial marriage is not merely discriminating on the basis of the 
employee’s preference in the race of their partner, but is discriminating 
on the basis of the employee’s race itself.  Associational discrimination 
is a rhetorically powerful theory to advance the “sexual orientation 
discrimination as sex discrimination” argument, and unlike the 
comparative or stereotyping theories, it has not been singled out for 
skepticism in supportive opinions.106  Undoubtedly, some of that 
strength comes from the previous success of a Loving-style argument 
in the same-sex marriage context.107 
The consideration of non-monosexual identities in this theory, 
unfortunately, undermines its ultimate goal of adequately capturing all 
instances of sexual orientation discrimination. Consider an employer 
who fires a heterosexual male employee upon discovering that his wife 
is bisexual.  While that would be a case of clear sexual orientation 
discrimination, the associational theory would fail to link the 
discrimination to the plaintiff’s sex, because the sex of his partner 
conforms to heterosexual relationship norms.  In contrast, consider an 
employer who fires an asexual employee because of their lack of 
 
 103. See Hively, 853 F.3d 345–47. 
 104. Id. at 347. 
 105. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967). 
 106. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 134 (Jacobs, J. concurring) (expressing skepticism about 
application of the comparative method or sex stereotyping to sexual orientation 
discrimination but endorsing the associational theory); Hively, 853 F.3d at 357 (Flaum, 
J., concurring). 
 107. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (invoking Loving’s 
holdings on the importance of marriage and the interaction of the Equal Protection 
and Due Process clauses to guarantee rights to LGBT persons). 
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association.  The associational theory does not provide a clear pathway 
to link the decision to fire the asexual employee to the “sex” of another 
person, as opposed to the much broader concept of engaging in 
sexuality. 
C. Sex Stereotyping 
The final theory advanced in Zarda and Hively is that discrimination 
against LGBT people is actually discrimination based on 
nonconformity with gender stereotypes, referred to a “sex-
stereotyping.”108  There is both a behavior-based and identity-based 
version of this argument.109  A person who acts “stereotypically gay” 
may be said to not conform to certain gender stereotypes.  For instance, 
the effeminate gay man who is singled out as “girly” or “not a real man” 
may have a claim for sex stereotyping based on the treatment of his 
behavior.  However, this theory would not protect LGBT people who 
do not act in a “stereotypically gay” way.  For example, the concurring 
opinion in Zarda rejected the stereotyping claim because there was no 
record of gendered remarks or impressions made about the plaintiff’s 
sexual orientation.110  Despite the plaintiff’s brief disclosure of his 
homosexual orientation to a client, he apparently did not conform to 
gay stereotypes and could be described as “straight-passing.”111 
This behavior-based iteration of the sex-stereotyping theory creates 
an absurdity in which it is illegal to fire someone for “acting” 
stereotypically gay, but not for merely being gay.112  For example, a 
straight-passing homosexual can be denied Title VII protections 
merely by disclosing their sexual orientation, because the 
discrimination was not based on a stereotype.  In contrast, if a 
heterosexual is misidentified as LGBT and thereby discriminated 
against, that misidentification, often stemming from sex-stereotypes, is 
 
 108. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119; Hively, 853 F.3d at 342. 
 109. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119; Hively, 853 F.3d at 342. 
 110. Zarda 883 F.3d at 135 (Jacobs, J., concurring). 
[T]he record does not associate Mr. Zarda with any sexual stereotyping. The 
case arises from his verbal disclosure of his sexual orientation during his 
employment as a skydiving instructor, and that is virtually all we know about 
him. It should not be surprising that a person of any particular sexual 
orientation would earn a living jumping out of airplanes; but Mr. Zarda 
cannot fairly be described as evoking somebody’s sexual stereotype of 
homosexual men. 
Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1266 (11th Cir. 2017) (Rosenbaum, J., 
dissenting). 
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actionable under Title VII.  This creates another absurdity that flows 
from the first: straight employees who “act gay” are more protected 
than gay employees who “act straight.” 
To address this absurdity, the Hively and Zarda opinions suggest 
that identifying as LGBT is itself a violation of a gender stereotype, 
and therefore, all sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination 
because of a failure to conform to sex stereotypes.113  To some extent, 
this is not a radical belief, even by courts that disfavor recognizing 
sexual orientation as a protected category under Title VII.114  
However, because a stereotype of presuming heterosexuality would 
theoretically impact and burden men and women equally, judges have 
cast doubt on whether heterosexuality can fairly be called a sex 
stereotype.115  Indeed, if “exposing one sex to disadvantageous terms 
of employment that the other sex is not” remains the critical inquiry, 
as in Harris, a theory of both gay men and women violating the same 
stereotype of heterosexuality would be insufficient.116  As roughly the 
same amount of men and women are non-heterosexual, a stereotype of 
heterosexuality would not have a disparate impact on one sex, nor be 
an effective proxy to discriminate based on biological sex.117 
A theory that homosexuality that inherently violates the stereotype 
of heterosexuality also fails to functionally protect the entire spectrum 
of sexual orientations.  For example, it is unclear whether asexual 
people violate a “stereotype” that all persons must be engaged in 
sexual relationships.  It is also unclear whether a gay employer at an 
LGBT organization could, within his or her rights, fire an employee 
upon discovering that the employee is heterosexual.  In the latter case, 
despite obvious sexual orientation discrimination, the employee could 
not bring a sex stereotyping claim because they acted in accordance 
with the stereotype of heterosexuality.  While hypothetical 
discrimination against heterosexuals may not be a concern, this 
limitation illustrates the perils of attempting to add an entire protected 
class under the umbrella of violating a stereotype of a defined majority. 
 
 113. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119; Hively, 853 F.3d at 342. 
 114. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that “all 
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 116. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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D. The Three Theories at Oral Argument 
In Bostock and R.R. Funeral Homes, the government and 
employees’ attorneys relied on the limitations of the three theories at 
oral argument.  The argument that sexual orientation discrimination 
and sex stereotyping are necessarily linked was boldly advanced when 
counsel for Mr. Bostock quoted the en banc Second Circuit in Zarda: 
The attempt to carve out discrimination against men for being gay 
from Title VII cannot be administered with either consistency or 
integrity. In the words of the en banc Second Circuit, it forces judges 
to . . . resort to lexical bean counting where they count up the 
frequency of epithets, such as “fag,” “gay,” “queer,” “real man,” and 
“fem,” to determine whether or not discrimination is based on sex or 
sexual orientation. That attempt is futile[.]118 
Chief Justice Roberts was the first to suggest that an employer could 
hypothetically discriminate against a gay person, as Justice Alito later 
says, “behind the veil of ignorance,” without ever discovering their 
sex.119  Associational discrimination is deployed as a rebuttal and later 
as a hypothetical by Justice Breyer, albeit with a comparison to 
discrimination against interfaith couples.120  The comparative test was 
primarily assailed by counsel for the employer, who argued that the 
“critical inquiry” for Title VII purposes was the Harris test of “whether 
members of one sex were being treated worse than members of the 
other sex.”121  Here, members of both sexes would be discriminated 
against by an anti-LGBT rule.  As Justice Ginsburg suggested, 
however, this could allow employers that only hire members of one sex 
to discriminate freely on issues like marital status — as there would be 
no comparison.122  Oncale would always lose his sex harassment claim, 
merely because his workplace had no women.123  This also risks 
reinforcing the bisexual harasser defense, as a bisexual harasser would 
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word was not invoked during oral argument in Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), 
a case brought against the Westboro Baptist Church for picketing a funeral with their 
signature “GOD HATES FAGS” signs and chants. 
 119. Id. at 8, 51–52. 
 120. Id. at 38. 
 121. Id. at 32. 
 122. Id. at 57 (referencing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th 
Cir. 1971)). In Sprogis, a female stewardess was fired because she was married. Sprogis, 
444 F.2d at 1196. 
 123. See supra Section I.C. 
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not impose a burden on male employees that he does not also impose 
on female ones.124 
III.  ALTERNATIVES TO DISPARATE IMPACT-DEPENDENT THEORIES 
Given the Court’s apparent flirtation with reinvigorating the Harris 
inquiry, it is urgent that we recognize its inconsistent application thus 
far and develop alternatives that provide more consistent and just 
inquires.  This final Part will advance alternative theories that seek to 
better include non-monosexual identities in their analysis and to 
conceptually link gender identity and sexual orientation 
discrimination. 
It is no secret that with the retirement of Justice Kennedy and the 
appointment of Brett Kavanaugh, LGBT activists are more pessimistic 
about their chance of success before the Court.125  At least some 
commentators believe that the conservative justices’ emphasis of the 
original statutory meaning in recent opinions is foreshadowing a 
rejection of expanded Title VII protections for LGBT persons.126  
Despite the recent victories in Hively and Zarda, the weight of circuit 
precedent still cuts against an LGBT-inclusive view of Title VII.127  
 
 124. See supra Part I. 
 125. See German Lopez, Anthony Kennedy’s Retirement Is Devastating for 
LGBTQ Rights, VOX MEDIA (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/6/27/17510902/anthony-kennedy-retirement-
lgbtq-gay-marriage-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/E5DM-VNB2]; Jim Obergefell, I 
Brought the Case that Made Same-Sex Marriage Legal. Anthony Kennedy’s 
Retirement Threatens All We Have Won, TIME (June 28, 2018), 
http://time.com/5324824/supreme-court-anthony-kennedy-obergefell/ 
[https://perma.cc/K9JF-WYMT]; cf. Masha Gessen, The Dread of Waiting for the 
Supreme Court to Rule on L.G.B.T. Rights, NEW YORKER (Apr. 23, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-dread-of-waiting-for-the-
supreme-court-to-rule-on-lgbt-rights [https://perma.cc/6834-7SUH]; Eugene Scott, In 
Kavanaugh’s Non-Answer on Same-Sex Marriage, Many Heard a Troubling 
Response, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/07/kavanaughs-non-answer-same-
sex-marriage-many-heard-troubling-answer [https://perma.cc/K2R3-27BQ]. 
 126. Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Just Handed a Big, Unanimous 
Victory to Workers. Wait, What?, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2019/01/gorsuch-arbitration-labor-new-prime-oliveira.html 
[https://perma.cc/X625-8R4Q]; see also New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 535 
(2019) (urging judges not to freely invest old statutes with new meanings lest they risk 
“amending legislation outside the ‘single . . . and exhaustively considered . . . . 
procedure’ the Constitution commands” (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 
(1983)). 
 127. See, e.g., Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 
2012); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2009); see also 
Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Higgins v. New 
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut 
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That said, there is still room for optimism as these cases go before the 
Supreme Court.  That the Hively majority included five Republican 
appointees, including Judge Easterbrook, indicates the strength of its 
textual argument.128  However, success before the Supreme Court may 
require that the Court finally addresses whether discrimination 
“because of sex” requires a finding of discrimination between men and 
women, or if it can more broadly encompass discriminatory acts 
motivated by sex-related traits of the target.  With that broader 
understanding of what constitutes “because of sex,” the following 
rationales could link sex and sexual orientation discrimination in a way 
that creates a cause of action under Title VII, but does not reinforce 
either the gender-binary nor monosexist ideas by focusing on the 
comparative impact of discrimination between men and women. 
A. Focus on Flaum: Creating a “Reliance on Sex-Based 
Considerations” Standard 
In his Hively concurrence, Judge Flaum suggests that the proper 
inquiry is not Harris’s focus on “whether members of one sex are 
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to 
which members of the other sex are not exposed,” but is instead 
whether “gender was a factor in the employment decision.”129  He 
suggests this reading is supported not only by the plurality in Price 
Waterhouse but is also faithful to the 1991 amendments to the Civil 
Rights Act.130  The Pregnancy  Discrimination Act and the 1991 
amendments were meant to codify some of the dicta of Price 
Waterhouse and overturn the court’s narrowing of Title VII’s 
applicability to racial discrimination cases in Wards Cove Packing v. 
Atonio.131  The relevant language from the 1991 amendment reads: 
“[a]n unlawful employment practice is established when the 
complaining party demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
 
of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 
(5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
 128. Mark Joseph Stern, A Thunderbolt From the 7th Circuit, SLATE (Apr. 5, 2017), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/04/the-7th-circuit-rules-that-anti-gay-
employment-discrimination-is-illegal.html [https://perma.cc/2YNX-MK4Y]. 
 129. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 359 (7th Cir. 2017) (Flaum, 
J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
 130. See id. at 358–59. 
 131. “The purposes of this act are . . . to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide 
adequate protection to victims of discrimination.” The Civil Rights Act of 1991, S. 
1745, 102d Cong. § 3 (1992). 
454 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
motivated the practice.”132  This language, Judge Flaum wrote, 
establishes a lower threshold for how much “sex” must factor into the 
adverse employment decision for there to be Title VII liability.  This 
lower threshold effectuates the Price Waterhouse plurality’s note that 
Congress meant to establish Title VII liability whenever an employer 
has “relied upon sex-based considerations.”133  It also bears some 
resemblance to the language from the Brennan dissent in Gilbert that 
helped shape the Pregnancy Discrimination Act — that pregnancy is at 
the very least “strongly sex-related.”134 
The “sex-based considerations” or “strongly sex-related trait” 
standards, articulated in dicta by the Price Waterhouse plurality,135 and 
arguably endorsed by Congress in both 1979 and 1991,136 help establish 
liability for sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination in a 
way that effectively captures a wider variety of sexual orientations.  
One cannot identify the sexual orientation of a person unless one 
knows the sexes to which they are attracted.137  This includes non-
monosexual orientations.138  In short, to consider someone’s sexual 
orientation when making a hiring decision always involves considering 
their sex.  Considering sexual orientation therefore runs afoul of Title 
VII’s intent to make “sex” irrelevant to the selection, evaluation, or 
compensation of any employee.139 
Focusing on whether an individual experiences discrimination based 
on consideration of their sex, rather than how the alleged 
discrimination itself comparatively disadvantaged one sex, is both 
 
 132. Id. (emphasis added). 
 133. Hively, 853 F.3d at 359 (Flaum, J., concurring) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989)). 
 134. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 148–49 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 135. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240–42. 
 136. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1978); 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, S. 1745, 102d Cong. § 3 (1992). 
 137. See Homosexual, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/homosexual (last visited Jan. 17, 2020) (“[O]f, relating to, or 
characterized by a tendency to direct sexual desire toward another of the same sex.”) 
(emphasis added); see also Homosexual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(“Of relating to, or characterized by sexual desire for a person of the same sex.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 138. See Bisexual, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://unabridged.merriam-
webster.com/unabridged/bisexual (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (“[O]f, relating to, or 
characterized by a tendency to direct sexual desire toward both sexes.”) (emphasis 
added); Pansexual, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://unabridged.merriam-
webster.com/collegiate/pansexual (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (“Pansexual people are 
attracted to all kinds of people, regardless of their gender, sex or presentation.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 139. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240. 
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consistent with Title VII and would conclusively end the absurdity of 
the bisexual harasser defense.140  First, as Judge Flaum noted in his 
Hively concurrence, the Supreme Court stated in City of Los Angeles, 
Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart that Title VII’s “focus on the 
individual is unambiguous.”141  A focus on the individual who 
experiences an act of discrimination, rather than on their experiences 
compared to those of their colleagues, would eliminate the need to 
determine if other sexes had experienced sex-based discrimination.  
While this focus on the individual seems to conflict with the Harris v. 
Forklift Systems standard reaffirmed in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, neither Harris nor Oncale rebuked Manhart, and the need for 
a comparator remained ambiguous. 
Elimination of the bisexual harasser defense is another reason to 
reject the Harris “disparate treatment” standard in favor of a more 
individualized inquiry that focuses on discrimination experienced by 
the employee suggested by Price Waterhouse and Manhart. If the focus 
of the inquiry turns on how an individual experiences discrimination, 
“each [affected] employee’s claim satisfies Title VII on its face, no 
matter the sex of any other employee who experienced 
discrimination.”142  The bisexual harasser defense would fail under this 
inquiry as each act of discrimination or harassment by the hypothetical 
bisexual harasser would constitute a complete claim under Title VII.  
This shift would bring about the long called-for “adjustment in 
subsidiary doctrines” embraced by Judges Bork and Scalia in their 
Taylor dissent.143  Elimination of a comparison requirement would 
resolve the circuit split over application of Price Waterhouse, making 
it clear sex-stereotyping affecting an employment decision is actionable 
even if it puts “equal” burdens on men and women.  This conceptual 
shift would shore-up the sex-stereotyping theory advanced by the 
Hively and Zarda courts by eliminating the argument that a stereotype 
of heterosexuality imposes that kind of “equal” burden. 
B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination Is a Function of Sex 
Discrimination 
A second way to link sexual orientation discrimination to sex 
discrimination is to define “sex” as inclusive of “sexuality” because 
 
 140. See Applebaum, supra note 50. 
 141. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 359 n.2 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(Flaum, J., concurring) (quoting City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702, 708 (1978)). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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sexuality is a function of sex.  This interpretation is not only 
contemporary;144 definitions of “sex” contemporaneous to the passage 
of Title VII included phrases such as “the whole sphere of behavior 
related even indirectly to the sexual functions and embracing all 
affectionate and pleasure-seeking conduct.”145  This analysis is related 
to the inability to define sexual orientation without reference to “sex,” 
but goes further to consider how sexuality and its regulation have been 
historically tied in the United States to maintaining gender roles.  To a 
certain extent, this analysis mirrors (and certainly supports) the third 
theory advanced by the circuit courts,146 that punishing homosexuals is 
a form of sex-stereotyping, but rather than focusing on defining 
stereotypes it focuses on the way that “sex” and “sexual orientation” 
have been defined and linked by the state and individuals. 
While some courts, including the Supreme Court, consider 
discrimination against transgender persons and sexual minorities 
discrete phenomena,147 early discriminatory laws targeted the entirety 
of the LGBT community using shared labels and tactics in pursuit of 
one goal: regulation of sex and gender norms.  Early American 
sexologists classified cross-dressing persons and sexual minorities alike 
as having a “perverted sex” such that “they hate the opposite sex and 
love their own; men become women and women become men.”148  
Having an “inverted” sex described the individual in totality, and their 
sexual conduct was only one aspect of that larger sex inversion.149  The 
 
 144. Sex can be defined as either “one’s identity as either female or male” or 
“especially the collection of characteristics that distinguish [the sexes],” both 
contemporary definitions that support application to gender identity and sex 
stereotypes. Sex, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2019). 
 145. William Eskridge, Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination 
Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 338 (2017) (quoting 
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2296 (2d 
unabridged ed. 1961)). 
 146. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 119 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 147. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in three different cases, slating the cases 
about sexual orientation discrimination for argument before argument about 
transgender discrimination cases. This suggests that the Court considers the question 
of whether either form of discrimination is “sex” discrimination as two questions. See 
Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 2049 (2019); R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 
Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 2049 (2019); Zarda, 883 F.3d 100. 
 148. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 
22 (2002). 
 149. INST. OF MEDICINE OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, COMM. ON LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER HEALTH ISSUES AND RESEARCH GAPS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES, THE HEALTH OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER 
PEOPLE: BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING 33 (2011), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK64806/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK64806.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N3L4-CM8B]. 
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link between gender roles and defining sexuality at this time was so 
strong that men who engaged in a stereotypically “masculine” or 
insertive roles during gay sex were not considered “inverts” because 
they were “psychologically” fulfilling their prescribed biological 
role.150  As municipalities increased their regulation (and prosecution) 
of non-heterosexual sex acts, they at the same time increased their 
regulation of once-popular drag shows and spaces known to encourage 
gender-nonconformity, believing gender and sexual deviation to be 
strongly related.151  In the Immigration and Naturalization Act, passed 
the year after the Civil Rights Act, homosexuals, bisexuals, and 
transgender people alike were described as “sexual deviants.”152  In 
short, the history of legally-sanctioned sexual orientation 
discrimination in this country is one of enforcing traditional sex roles, 
sex stereotypes, and regulating LGBT persons’ expressions of their 
own sex. 
Discriminatory laws today are more targeted against subsets of the 
LGBT community who are more vulnerable, but that does not mean 
that sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination do not share 
a common foundation.  The arguments deployed to deny transgender 
people the right to use the bathroom consistent with their gender 
identity bear a startling resemblance to those used to justify anti-gay 
discrimination.  During the debate over a so-called “bathroom bill” in 
Texas, a letter signed by hundreds of local pastors expressed concern 
for “the privacy, safety and freedom of our women and children.”153  
This specter of pro-LGBT laws exposing children to violence — and 
the potential of “recruitment” — matches language used by Anita 
Bryant during her “Save Our Children” campaign to repeal such 
laws.154  Her husband described the campaign to repeal the Miami-
Dade anti-LGBT discrimination law as “strictly a defensive 
measure.”155 
 
 150. ESKRIDGE, supra note 148, at 38. 
 151. Id. at 45. 
 152. Immigration and Naturalization Act, PUB. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, 920 
(1965) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2014)). 
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MONTHLY (Aug. 1, 2017), 
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 155. Id. 
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There is also abundant social science research that indicates 
attitudes about LGBT people are primarily driven by one’s beliefs 
about and adherence to proper gender roles.  Numerous studies have 
found that one’s adherence or belief in “traditional” gender roles are 
among the strongest predictors, if not the strongest, of one’s attitudes 
towards LGBT persons.156  Some studies have found the link between 
traditional gender roles and homophobia to be stronger than between 
homophobia and both one’s sexual conservatism and gender role self-
concept.157  In short, at the psychological level, sex and gender are a 
consideration when one engages in sexual orientation discrimination. 
The linking of sex, sexuality, and gender identity as sharing a 
common motivation and history of discrimination prevents the absurd 
result that could occur if the Supreme Court were to find either sexual 
orientation or gender identity discrimination actionable, but not the 
other.  While the Supreme Court has decided to separate these 
questions between Altitude Express v. Zarda for sexual orientation 
discrimination and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. EEOC 
for gender identity discrimination, a pro-LGBT ruling in one case 
requires a pro-LGBT ruling in the other to effectuate it.  According to 
the National Center for Transgender Equality, a mere 12% of 
transgender persons identify as heterosexual.158  Therefore, if the 
Supreme Court in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes were to find that 
discrimination based on gender identity was actionable under Title 
VII, but sexual orientation discrimination is not, it would leave open a 
permissible basis to effectively discriminate against 88% of transgender 
persons by proxy.159  Considering that those who harbor anti-
transgender animus often also harbor animus against sexual 
minorities,160 the ineffectiveness of only finding one form of 
discrimination actionable is not merely a hypothetical problem. 
 
 156. See Aubrey Lynne DeCarlo, The Relationship between Traditional Gender 
Roles and Negative Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gay Men in Greek-Affiliated and 
Independent Male College Students 59 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Lehigh 
University) (on file with Lehigh Preserve), 
https://preserve.lehigh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2469&context=etd 
[https://perma.cc/ZV27-6NHQ]; see also Julie Nagoshi et al., Gender Differences in 
Correlates of Homophobia and Transphobia, 59 SEX ROLES 521, 529 (2008). 
 157. Michael Stevenson & Barbara Medler, Is Homophobia a Weapon of Sexism?, 
4 J. MEN’S STUDIES 1, 2 (1995). 
 158. See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 15, at 246. 
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 160. Amy B. Becker et al., Moral Politicking: Public Attitudes toward Gay Marriage 
in an Election Context, 14 INTL J. PRESS/POL. 186, 186–92 (2009) (finding that attitudes 
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Ironically, at oral argument, the Court appeared willing to link the 
fate of the sexual orientation and gender identity cases — but for the 
wrong reason: in a word, bathrooms.  During the arguments in Bostock, 
one of the sexual orientation cases, the only hypotheticals posed to 
counsel that actually involved behavior in the workplace — rather than 
abstractions from behind the veil of ignorance — were about trans 
people using bathrooms consistent with their gender identity.  
Bathrooms are mentioned 18 times in Bostock, which is one more time 
than “bathroom” was mentioned in the immediately following gender 
identity case, R.G. & Martin Funeral Homes.161  The irony is only 
heightened when one considers that while sexual minorities’ use of 
restrooms is no longer of legislative interest to the states, the cruel and 
false specter of predators in the “wrong” restroom was historically 
deployed against gay men, lesbians, and racial minorities.162 
The linking of sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation 
discrimination under an umbrella of discrimination meant to reinforce 
sex-norms, however, would effectively capture non-omnisexual 
orientations and non-binary gender identities.  Discrimination against 
each of these persons, from the bisexual man to the asexual 
transgender woman, is sex-discrimination because that discrimination 
itself is historically and psychologically a means of regulating sex and 
its expression.  If the discrimination is inherently based on sex, and 
consideration of traditional gender roles, no comparisons to other 
parties are needed, rendering disparate impact inquiries irrelevant. 
C. Statistics to Establish Sex-Specific Impacts of Discrimination 
If the Supreme Court were to perpetuate the Harris inquiry, as 
employer’s counsel at oral argument urged, requiring the sexes to be 
exposed to different disadvantageous terms, it could remain possible 
to sustain a claim of sex discrimination by looking to data about the 
different impacts of anti-LGBT discrimination depending on one’s sex.  
While a stereotype of heterosexuality could impose the same command 
on both sexes, it does not mean both sexes feel the effects of that 
command equally.  For instance, gay men on average are paid between 
 
 161. Bostock Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 99 with Transcript of Oral 
Argument, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 2049 (2019). 
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10 and 32% less than their heterosexual counterparts.163  While lesbian 
women do not report similar rates of pay discrimination compared to 
their heterosexual counterparts, they experience other forms of 
discrimination, such as harassment, at similar rates.164  Internationally, 
evidence suggests that gay men are disproportionately discriminated 
against in traditionally male-dominated fields, and lesbians are 
disproportionately discriminated against in traditionally women-led 
fields.165  This data again suggests that, in fact, anti-LGBT 
discrimination is driven primarily by sex stereotypes and does not 
impact lesbians and gay men the same way within a single workplace.  
Bisexuals experience workplace discrimination differently as well, 
being uniquely vulnerable to hyper sexualization in the workplace and 
experiencing biphobia, sometimes at the hands of gay or lesbian 
employees.166  In other words, because of how sexual orientation and 
sex discrimination interact, there are, in fact, differences in how sexual 
orientation discrimination manifests itself across sex-based lines that 
create different “disadvantageous terms” for different sexes. 
Ultimately, this solution is sub-optimal because by preserving a 
“disparate impact on the sexes” requirement, discrimination based on 
sexual orientation may be actionable, but it also allows the absurdity 
of the bisexual harasser defense to persist.  Further, it is unclear if these 
sorts of population-based studies of how different segments of the 
LGBT community experience discrimination would be sufficient to 
satisfy the Harris inquiry, as different manifestations of discrimination 
may not constitute “disadvantageous terms of employment.” 
CONCLUSION 
Discrimination against LGBT Americans in the workplace is a 
longstanding phenomenon.  While the specter of a “Briggs 
Initiative”167 designed to categorically deny LGBT persons the right to 
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hold a particular job is no longer front of mind, the reality remains that 
an LGBT person can now “be married on a Sunday and fired on a 
Monday” in most states.168  Even if the majority of LGBT Americans 
live in urban areas with generally more accepting attitudes of sexual 
and gender minorities, they are still regularly victimized regardless.169  
The opinions of the Hively and Zarda courts represent encouraging 
recognition that Title VII’s broad text reaches more than 
discrimination that only targets men or women in a vacuum.  However, 
lasting success before the Supreme Court may require elimination of 
the longstanding disparate impact requirement in sex discrimination 
cases.  This shift in doctrine, which can be rooted in precedent and later 
congressional amendments, opens the door for other theories of sexual 
orientation discrimination as sex discrimination that do not perpetuate 
the Court’s silence on non-monosexual identities.  The new 
individualized inquiries — either (1) whether a person was 
discriminated against and their sex was a factor; or (2) whether the 
discrimination experienced by the individual was driven by adherence 
to traditional sex-roles — not only will protect the previously invisible 
bisexual victim of employment discrimination but would also finally 
erase the bisexual harasser defense. 
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